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Abstract 
 
 
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information or 
beliefs on volatility. Using high-frequency intraday data, we estimate the volatility effect of a 
well identified shock on the volatility of the stock returns of large European banks as a 
function of the quality of available public information about the banks. We hypothesise that, 
as the publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence 
should increase, as the private information (beliefs) of investors becomes more important. We 
find strong support for this idea in the data. We argue that the results have implications for 
debate surrounding the opacity of banks and the transparency requirements that may be 
imposed on banks under Pillar III of the New Basel Accord. 
 
JEL codes: G21, G14 
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Stock volatility can be the result of the arrival of public information, the presence of 
differences private information (or beliefs) among traders and the presence of irrational 
noise traders (mis-pricing). In this paper we use a new approach to estimate the effect of 
differences in private information on volatility. We examine the question in the context 
of high frequency stock returns for a set of large European banks. We use a well 
identified, unexpected shock (monetary policy surprises) and estimate the change in 
banks’ stock return volatility. To measure volatility, we use “realised volatility”, as 
recently proposed by Andersen et al. (2003). We relate the change in volatility to a 
proxy for the accuracy or “freshness” of public information available about banks, the 
annual report. Our hypothesis is that if the public information available is stale, we 
should observe a larger spike in volatility, if volatility is driven by traders with different 
private information or beliefs. We argue that higher quality, timelier public information 
results in a closer alignment of information sets of traders, leaving less room for private 
information or beliefs to drive volatility. We also hypothesise and test an inverse 
relation between the persistence of volatility and the quality of the publicly available 
information. 
The paper can be viewed as a test of the theories proposed by Harris and Raviv 
(1993) and Shalen (1993). Harris and Raviv (1993) develop a model of trading in a 
speculative market based on the difference of opinion among traders. In the model 
traders share common prior beliefs and receive common information, but differ in the 
way in which they interpret this information. In our paper, we use the quality of the 
public information that traders receive as a proxy for the extent to which they will differ 
in their interpretation of this information. If the public signal is more precise this leaves 
less room for differences in interpretation and therefore the spike in volatility 
subsequent to a shock should be smaller and less persistent. Similarly, Shalen (1993) 
examines a noise rational expectations model and shows that the dispersion of beliefs 
(i.e. the degree to which traders disagree about the future) explains the volatility of 
returns. The higher this dispersion the higher volatility, which has a direct 
correspondence in our paper: the weaker the publicly available information, the greater 
the dispersion of trader’s beliefs and the higher volatility. 
Our work is closely related to the literature on the importance of informed 
traders to explain (excess) volatility in financial markets. French and Roll (1986), 
Barclay et al. (1990), Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Ito and Lin (1992), and Ito et al. 
(1998) compare volatility at the time when markets are open to volatility when they are   2
closed to distinguish the role of private versus public information in explaining 
volatility. The seminal paper in this literature, French and Roll (1986) compare 
volatility when stock market are closed to when they are open, keeping the flow of 
public information constant. They find that return volatility decreases during these 
closures. They argue that since public information cannot be the reason and mis-pricing 
seems to be small, private information is the main source of high trading-time volatility 
at times when the exchanges are open. Along similar lines, Barclay et al. (1990) 
examine stock return volatility for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, exploiting the phase out 
of half-day trading on Saturdays. They show that weekend volatility fell after the phase-
out.
1  
Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Ito and Lin (1992) and Ito et al. (1998) 
concentrate on the effect of lunch breaks on volatility. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) 
show that volatility during the lunch break is significantly lower than in the morning or 
the afternoon (U shape). Ito and Lin (1992) compare the lunch time volatility of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, which does break for lunch, with the one of the NYSE, which 
does not. They find that the dip in volatility at the NYSE is much smaller than in Tokyo 
and attribute that to the absence in Tokyo of trading based on private information. Ito et 
al. (1998) examine the effect of phasing out the lunch breaks at the Tokyo foreign 
exchange market. They find that volatility doubles with the introduction of trading over 
lunch and argue that this cannot be due to changes in the arrival of public information, 
as there was no change in public information flows associated with the change in 
opening hours of the exchange. 
The paper is also related to the previous literature on the effect of macro 
announcements on asset levels and volatility (see e.g. Hautsch and Hess, 2002 (US T-
Bond futures); Fleming and Remolona, 1999 (US Treasury market), Goodhart et al., 
1993 (exchange rates); Almeida et al., 1998 (exchange rates); Ederington and Lee, 
1993, 1995 (interest rates and exchange rates, forward rates)). Even though Hautsch and 
Hess (2002) examine the US Treasury bond futures market, their ideas are most similar 
to ours. They examine the effect of the release of the US employment report 
simultaneously on the mean and the variance of Treasury bond futures using an intraday 
ARCH model. The find that non-anticipated information leads to a sharp price reaction 
and even controlling for this, they find a strong and persistent increase in volatility. 
They interpret this finding as providing evidence for “considerable disagreement among 
traders about the precise implications of macroeconomic news, which are only slowly 
                                                 
1 It is possible that their result is driven by a decline in the arrival of public information, as Saturday 
announcements of public information and other market activities were also phased out.   3
resolved.” Hence, Hautsch and Hess (2002) share with this paper their concern for 
volatility arising from differences in views among traders (or differences in private 
information among traders) and the impact of the un-anticipated information itself. In 
Fleming and Remolona (1999), the authors also raise the issue of differences in private 
views driving volatility. They examine the effect of the arrival of public information on 
the level and volatility of prices in the U.S. Treasury Bill market. They find that the 
release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly 
instantaneous price change with a persistent effect on volatility. They argue that the 
persistence in the volatility stems from “residual disagreements among investors about 
what precisely the just-released information means for prices”. However, they do not 
attempt to formally relate these differences in private views to differences in the 
underlying information sets. 
We are not aware of any evidence on the effect of monetary policy on high 
frequency stock data.
2 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), Thorbecke (1997), Bomfim 
(2003) and Lobo (2000) examine the effect of monetary policy on daily stock returns. 
Bomfim (2003), for example, similarly to our paper examines the effect of monetary 
policy surprises on stock price volatility. He finds, as we do, that monetary policy 
surprises increase volatility significantly in the short run; however, as in Fleming and 
Remolona (1999) he does not link the extent to which volatility increases to the 
information set of traders. As far as we are aware there is no evidence of the effect of 
monetary policy on bank stock prices, even though one could argue that banks’ stocks 
should be a particularly interesting area for studying the effect of monetary policy. 
Even so, our primary interest is not in the monetary policy shock per se. We 
chose un-anticipated monetary policy decisions, because their size and timing are easily 
identifiable. Similarly, bank stock prices are particularly interesting when examining the 
effect of differences in information sets of traders, as banks are generally considered to 
be particularly opaque (see e.g. Morgan, 2002) and analysing the value of publicly 
released information to market participants may be particularly interesting.
3 
In the paper, we use the vintage of the release of the annual report as a measure 
of the precision of the information available about banks and, hence, the degree to 
which traders may disagree as to the extent of the implications of the monetary policy 
shock. Specifically, we estimate the change in volatility due to the shock as a function 
                                                 
2 Also related to is a paper by Andersen et al. (2005), who examine the effect of many different 
macroeconomic announcements on futures contracts. Among many other assets, they also consider the 
effect of US monetary policy decisions on futures contracts of the FTSE100 and the S&P 500. Their 
paper, however, focuses on conditional mean jumps, rather than volatility. 
3 For the opposing views that banks may not be particularly opaque (but rather “boring”) see Flannery et 
al. (2004).   4
of the number of months, since the bank published its last annual report. Hence, we 
examine whether the effect on volatility is smaller if the bank just published its annual 
report last month compared to the volatility response if the bank published its last 
annual report, say, 8 months ago. The argument is quite simple: The more recent the 
publication of the annual report, the smaller the disagreement of traders as to the 
implications of the shock for the future profitability of the bank. Equivalently, the more 
recent the publication of the annual report, the more aligned the information sets of 
traders and the less important private information. Of course, these arguments only 
apply, if annual reports of banks in fact convey any useful information to markets. In 
this sense, our approach is a joint test of the presence of private information and the 
value of bank annual reports to markets. 
The paper is directly related to the question of the opacity of banks’ assets 
(Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 2004) and whether publishing annual reports generally 
and whether improving the frequency and quality of these reports specifically, reduces 
this opacity and is valuable to the market. The only evidence we are aware of on this 
issue with regards to banks is provided in Baumann and Nier (2004). Baumann and Nier 
estimate a measure of annual volatility of banks’ stocks as a function of a disclosure 
index based on the information available in Bankscope and some controls. Their results 
suggest that banks disclosing more items in Bankscope tend to show lower annual 
volatility. In this paper we relate opacity to the importance of private information in the 
market. If banks are indeed opaque, the volatility of banks’ stocks can be expected to 
increase significantly upon the arrival of surprising and relevant news and evidence that 
this volatility spike is lower for banks for which fresher public information is available 
would suggest that the vintage and the quality of accounting information matters and 
reduces the degree of opacity. 
Our results suggest that (i) un-anticipated monetary policy shocks result in a 
significant short term increase in bank stock volatility; anticipated monetary policy 
shocks do not; (ii) the increase in volatility is significantly higher in the case of banks, 
for which publicly available information is stale; (iii) this difference is economically 
quite large; and (iv) the increase in volatility is significantly more persistent in the case 
of banks, for which the publicly available information is stale, although this effect is 
economically small. 
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section we describe the 
methodology employed in the paper to measure volatility. Section 3 presents the data 
and section 4 the empirical model. In section 5 we report the results, section 6 examines 
robustness and section 7 concludes.   5
 
2.  Methodology: realised volatility 
Until recently, common ways to model conditional second moments have been based 
either on the GARCH parameterization proposed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) 
or the stochastic volatility methodology (see, for example, Hull and White, 1987, and 
Ghysels et al., 1996, for a survey). In this paper, instead, we use the realised volatility 
approach of Andersen et al. (2003). This methodology has the advantage of being 
model-independent and simple. In addition, it offers the possibility of applying standard 
econometric techniques to the resulting time series of volatility. 
  The realised volatility is an ex post measure and is designed for high-frequency 
data. It is computed by cumulating squared compounded returns across a certain time 
window. The returns, in turn, are computed over tiny intervals of that time window as 
log differences of equity prices. As the interval becomes infinitely small, the realised 
volatility converges in probability to the quadratic variation process of the returns. 
Hence, the quadratic variation describes unexpected jumps of second moments of 
returns. Under suitable conditions, the quadratic variation it is shown to be an unbiased 
and highly efficient estimator for the conditional covariance matrix of returns. 
 Let  h , h t+ r  be the  1 × n  vector of compounded returns over the h window. Its 
conditional distribution can be demonstrated to read as follows (see Andersen et al. 
(2003)): 
  { } [] h , s s t s t h , h t ,
0 ∈ + + + σ Σ μ r ~ ⎟
⎠
⎞ ⎜
⎝
⎛ ∫ ∫ + +
h
s t
h
s t ds , ds N
0 0 Ω μ .     (1) 
{}[] h , s , 0 ∈ ⋅ ⋅ σ  is the σ-field generated by ( ) [] h , s s t s t , 0 ∈ + + Σ μ , where  s t+ μ  is the conditional 
mean vector of returns and  s t+ Σ  is the associated covariance matrix. 
In a discrete time, univariate context, the empirical counterpart to the h-time 
window quadratic return variation is given by the realised volatility,  h , t RV , which is 
computed as follows: 
∑
Δ =
Δ Δ + − =
h , , j
, j h t h , t r RV
K 1
2 ,            ( 2 )  
where  Δ Δ + − , j h t r  is the compounded return over the Δ interval and h is the time window. 
We turn now to the choice of the Δ interval. In line with the recent 
microstructure literature (see, for instance, Andersen et al., 2000b, and Bandi and 
Russell, 2005), this choice is subject to a trade-off. On the one hand, the smaller is the 
interval, the lower is the sampling variation of the realised volatility. On the other hand,   6
the smaller is the interval, the larger is the contamination due to the microstructure 
noise. Bandi and Russell (2005) determine the optimal Δ interval minimising the mean-
squared error of the contaminated variance estimator. Using IBM equity tick prices, 
they find that the optimal interval is approximately two minutes. We choose the same 
interval, since the frequency of our data is similar to that of IBM. 
 
3.  Data 
3.1. Unanticipated monetary policy decisions 
We use unanticipated monetary policy decisions in the euro area and the UK as our 
shock variable. We chose this particular macroeconomic shock because we have precise 
information on its exact timing (to the minute) and magnitude, which is crucial in the 
context of examining tick data, and it is straightforward to differentiate between an 
anticipated and an un-anticipated component of the shock. Our sample period, which is 
determined by the availability of tick data (see below), is from January 1999 until May 
2004.  
ECB monetary policy decisions during January 1999 to December 2001 were 
taken on every second Thursday. After December 2001, the ECB moved to taking 
decisions only on the first Thursday of each month. As for the Bank of England (BoE), 
monetary policy decisions are taken once a month, usually on Thursdays, but there are 
also decisions taken on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. The sample includes 101 and 66 
ECB and BoE decision days, respectively. In order to differentiate between anticipated 
and unanticipated monetary policy decisions, we follow Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003) 
and use expectation data based on a Reuters poll of 25-30 market participants. The polls 
are conducted on the Friday before the meetings of the ECB Governing Council and the 
BoE Monetary Policy Committee. We use the mean of this survey as our expectation 
variable. Surprises are defined as the difference between the actual change in the ECB’s 
and BoE’s policy rates minus the mean of the Reuters poll. Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2003) show that these expectations are unbiased and efficient. 
Descriptive statistics on the monetary policy decisions are given in Table 1. As 
reported in Panel A, out of 101 ECB monetary policy decisions, 86 were to leave rates 
unchanged and on 15 days rates were either increased or decreased. Decreases and 
increases are about in balance, with seven changes up and eight changes down. In 
general, changes up were somewhat smaller on average (0.32%) compared to changes 
down (-0.44%). This is explained by the fact that the majority of increases were by 25 
basis points and the majority of decreases was by 50 basis points. In total, there were 56   7
surprises: 35 represent surprises with monetary policy being tighter than expected and 
21 represent surprises with looser than expected monetary policy. While market 
participants were more often wrong in the direction of looseness, their error was larger 
when they expected a tighter monetary policy. Given our definition of the monetary 
policy surprises, there is a surprise component on all days when rates were changed, 
although in many cases it is small. The statistics also suggest that there were 41 days 
when at least some market participants expected a change and the ECB decided to leave 
rates unchanged. 
Panel B reports similar statistics for the Bank of England’s monetary policy 
decisions. The Bank of England left rates unchanged 50 times out of 66 MPC meetings. 
A comparison between Panels A and B shows that the number of surprises relative to 
the BoE decisions is almost the same as that of ECB’s, despite the higher number of 
ECB decision days. All decisions by the Bank of England to move rates were by 25 
basis points. On the other hand, the magnitude of average surprises associated with the 
ECB decisions is larger than those of the Bank of England.
4 
 
3.2. Bank tick equity prices 
In order to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks on volatility, we use tick 
equity transaction prices from three stock exchanges, the Deutsche Börse, Euronext 
(Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris), and the London Stock Exchange.
5 The adoption of 
high frequency data is essential for two reasons. First, it permits to calculate volatility 
series across intraday windows. These windows, in turn, can be chosen so that one of 
them will commence exactly when the monetary policy decision is announced. This 
would allow us to very precisely measure the effect on volatility due to monetary policy 
shocks. Second, the effects of monetary policy shocks should be largely uncontaminated 
by other pieces of news. 
We constructed our sample of banks using sets of tick data covering the same 
period as our data on monetary policy shocks. In the case of Deutsche Börse and 
London Stock Exchange (“German sub-sample” and “UK sub-sample”, respectively) 
we have data from 1 January 1999 to 31 May 2004; however for Euronext data are only 
available for 1 January 2002 to 31 May 2004 (“Euronext sub-sample”). The Euronext 
                                                 
4 While there were a number of decisions taking place in the same week, which should not influence our 
results given our approach, same day decisions would be more problematic. There were two days with 
decisions of the Bank of England and the ECB on the same day during our sample period. The results 
reported below are robust to dropping those two days from the estimation. 
5 The two continental European stock exchanges for equity trading are order driven. The order types that 
may be submitted to the Central Order Book consist of market orders, limit orders, market-to-limit orders, 
stop orders and orders subject to special conditions. The London Stock Exchange also has market makers.   8
subsample is shorter because Euronext started making tick data available only in 2002. 
Within the three markets we limit ourselves to banks that are continuously traded 
throughout the sample period, which yields an initial number of six banks in the case of 
Euronext, six in the case of Deutsche Börse and five in the case of London Stock 
Exchange. 
From a close examination of the bank trading frequency two distinct groups 
emerge. The first group includes Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Hypovereinsbank, 
for the German sub-sample, ING, ABN Amro, BNP Paribas and Société Générale, for 
the Euronext sub-sample, and HSBC, Abbey National Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Barclays, in the case of the London Stock Exchange. The second group contains 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank, DePfa, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, KBC, Natexis Banques 
Populaires and Standard Chartered. The equities of the banks belonging to the first 
group (German and UK) were traded on average about 1000 times per day, whereas the 
shares of the other group were traded on average between 100 and 400 times per day.  
A preliminary analysis shows that, for the first group, the average volatility 
levels are quite similar across banks. Furthermore, volatilities exhibit the well-known 
U-shape across daily windows. Instead, volatility levels differ quite substantially within 
the second group and vis-à-vis the first group. In addition, volatilities behave quite 
erratically across daily windows. Therefore, we choose not to include the banks of the 
second group in our analysis, yielding a sample of eleven banks: Abbey National, ABN 
Amro, Barclays, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Hypovereinsbank, ING, BNP 
Paribas, Royal Bank of Scotland and Societe Generale. It turns out that these eleven 
banks represent, with one exception,
6 the largest publicly traded banks in Europe in 
terms of total assets. 
   We limit our sample to the day of the monetary policy decision of the ECB and 
the Bank of England, respectively, (usually a Thursday) and the days immediately 
before and after. Using only the two days immediately adjacent to the day of the 
monetary policy decision allows us to focus on the volatility effects of the surprises and, 
at the same time, to maintain a manageable sample size. For the Deutsche Börse sample 
this yields a sample size of 298 days for each of the three banks, for the shorter 
Euronext sample we obtain 86 days for each of the four banks.
7 
                                                 
6 Dresdner Bank is the only bank among the largest in Europe not part of our sample, as it was acquired 
by Allianz in early 1999. 
7 During 1999 to 2004 there were 101 monetary policy decision days of the ECB (Table 1). As we use the 
day before and after the decision day, we generally have three days multiplied by 101 decision days, i.e. 
303 days. However, there were 5 holidays in the sample for which no data are available. The sample for 
the Euronext banks was constructed equivalently, taking the shorter time period from 2002 to 2004 into 
account.   9
The computation of equity returns is problematic because observations are 
unequally spaced. In line with Andersen et al. (2003), we calculate two minute interval 
equity prices by linear interpolation of the two tick log prices immediately before and 
after the two minute time stamps. Slow trading activity before nine o’clock a.m. and 
after five o’clock p.m. justifies a choice of the trading day between 09:00:00 and 
17:00:00. However, for the euro area sub-sample the trading day starts at 09:09:00 and 
ends at 16:49:00 CET for the following reason. We divide the day into ten equally 
spaced windows (each composed of 46 minutes), with the seventh one commencing 
exactly at 13:45:00, when the ECB monetary policy decision is announced. This yields 
a sample size of 298 days for three banks with nine intervals per day (we lose one 
interval as we use lagged realised volatilities as one of our dependent variables), in total 
8046 observations for the Deutsche Börse sample. For the Euronext banks we 
equivalently obtain 86 days for four banks with nine intervals per day, i.e. 3096 
observations. 
As for the UK sub-sample, we also divide the trading day into ten equally 
spaced windows, 46 minutes each. The trading day starts at 08:56:00 and ends at 
16:36:00 local time, with the fifth window beginning exactly at 12:00:00, when the 
Bank of England announces its monetary policy. The time difference between the two 
central banks’ policy announcements, when they are made over the same day, is 45 
minutes. With daily windows of 46 minutes there will be no overlapping between the 
windows immediately following the policy announcements. This yields a sample size of 
198 days for four banks and nine intervals per day, i.e. 7128 observations. However, in 
case of the UK sample we had missing or incomplete data for some periods and also 
excluded some unreasonable small or large values for realised volatility (in excess of 
five standard deviations). These very high or low values were clustered within a few 
days and we excluded the entire day, if there was at least one outlier in a given day. In 
total the resulting sample contained 6678 observations on realised volatility for the four 
UK banks.
8 In total, therefore, the regressions below rely on 17820 observations for all 
banks combined. 
Descriptive statistics for equity 46 minutes window returns, standardised equity 
returns
9, realised volatilities and log of realised volatilities are given in Appendix I. As 
shown by the Ljung-Box test ( ) 10 Q  with ten lags, realised and standardised returns 
                                                 
8 Excluded observations were for HSBC the days 05/04/2001, 06/04/2001, 10/05/2001,03/10/2001 and 
10/01/2002; for Abbey National 06/06/2000 and 02/08/2000 (no data); for Royal Bank of Scotland 
07/12/2000 and 08/05/2002; for Barclays 02/08/2000. Finally, the data set did not contain data for HSBC 
for the period 01/01/1999-31/06/1999. 
9 Standardised equity returns are computed as the ratio of returns and their realised volatility.   10
exhibit no or low autocorrelation, while realised volatility and its log do. Return series 
on all banks and the related realised volatilities are not normal. Kurtosis is larger than 
three, indicating that the probability mass is concentrated more in the centre and tails 
relative to the normal. Data also show severely right skewed realised volatilities for all 
banks, whereas returns seem to be more symmetric, with the exception of 
Commerzbank. This is confirmed by the Jarque-Bera test for normality, and the 
theoretical quantile–quantile pictures (see Figure 1). 
The standardised returns and the log of realised volatilities are close to normal, 
as seen from kurtosis, skewness, the Jarque-Bera statistics, and the theoretical quantile–
quantile pictures (see Appendix I and Figure 1). Therefore, the distribution of 
standardised 46 minutes window returns and the relative log of realised volatilities can 
be assumed to be normal with 
2 1/
it it RV r
− ~ ( ) 1 0, N  and  ( ) it RV ln ~ ( )
2 σ μ, N , 
where  it r  and  it RV  are the return on asset i and the associated realised volatility, 
respectively. The assumption of normality allows us to use standard econometric 
methods when modelling the log of realised volatilities. 
For all banks we plot the log of realised volatilities versus daily windows (see 
figures 2a-2k). The values associated with each window are equal to log volatility 
averages across days. Each picture contains two curves of volatility averages 
corresponding to days of no monetary policy decisions, and days when monetary policy 
comes as a surprise, respectively. All the graphs show that volatilities are U-shaped, i.e. 
the volatility is higher at the beginning and the end of the trading day. This pattern is 
well documented in the literature (see, for instance, Engle, 2000). The level of volatility 
is similar across banks. The timing of a monetary policy shock is depicted by a vertical 
line in the chart and we can see a noticeable spike in volatility if monetary policy was 
un-anticipated, which only slowly dissipates. In the remainder of the paper we will 
attempt to explain the magnitude of the change in volatility in response to the 
unanticipated monetary policy shock as a function of the quality of public information 
available about the bank, hoping to uncover differences in volatility due to unobservable 
differences in private information or beliefs.  
 
4.  The econometric specification 
The objective of our model is to measure the effects of monetary policy surprises on 
volatility, taking into account information that investors possess at the time of the 
shock.  We estimate the following basic model:   11
,
_ _ _ _
_ _ int _
2 1 3 2 1
6
1
5
1
9
2
1 1 1 0
per d nomps mps fri d thur d montue d
bank d year d d LNRV LNRV
t t t t t t
i
i
t i i
i
t i i
i
t i t t
ρ θ θ ϕ ϕ ϕ
λ γ β α α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
− −        (3) 
where: 
i)  t LNRV  is the log of realised volatility for the window t. We introduce an 
autoregressive term to capture the high persistence of the volatility as evidenced by the 
Ljung-Box test (see Table 2).
10 
ii) 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
otherwise
window daily ith to correspond data the if
d i t 0
    1
int _ . 
We introduce the time window dummies  i t d int _  to accommodate the U-shape intra-
daily volatility of asset returns. The fourth window is the omitted category. 
[] . 2003 , 2002 , 2001 , 2000 , 1999   ,
0
1
_   iii) ∈
⎩
⎨
⎧
= i
i
i t year
otherwise
year to correspond data the if
year d
These time dummies take account of the possible changes in market volatility, for 
example related to the internet boom ending in 2001. 2004 is the omitted category. 
iv) 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
otherwise
bank to correspond data the if
bank _ d
i
i t 0
1
, 
[] bar , rbs , abbn , hsbc , sg , bnp , ing , abn , hb , cb banki ∈ .
11 The bank dummies allow us to 
capture the differences in the level of realised volatility across banks. Deutsche Bank is 
the omitted category.
12 
v) 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
otherwise
Tuesday or Monday a is day trading the if
montue dt 0
1
_  
vi) 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
otherwise
Thursday is day trading the if
thur dt 0
1
_ . 
vii) 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
otherwise
Friday is day trading the if
fri dt 0
1
_ . 
Monday, Tuesday (which we combined as we had relatively few observations), 
Thursday and, above all, Friday effects are captured by the daily dummies montue dt _ , 
thur dt _  and  fri dt _ . Wednesday is the omitted category. 
viii)  () t t t mean reuters i abs mps − Δ = , where  t i Δ  is different from zero only over the 
fourth and sixth daily windows, corresponding to a BoE and ECB interest rate change, 
                                                 
10 The construction of LNRVt-1 is done in such a way so that the observations corresponding to the first 
window are excluded. This is done because our sample is not continuous across days. 
11 We use the following abbreviations for the individual banks: cb stands for Commerzbank, hb for 
Hypovereinsbank, abn for ABN AMRO, ing for ING, bnp for BNP Paribas, sg for Société Générale, hsbc 
for HSBC Bank, abbn for Abbey National Bank, rbs for Royal Bank of Scotland and bar for Barclays. 
12 This approach is equivalent to running a fixed effects (for banks) panel regression. Results from a panel 
model are available from the authors upon request.   12
respectively, and  t mean reuters  is the average of the interest rate change expectations. 
Expectations on monetary policy decisions are computed by Reuters with a poll of 
market participants. 
ix)  .
otherwise
 
taken is decision
policy monetary BoE when a day the of th window  t
taken is decision
policy monetary ECB when an day the of th window  t
& mps if
nomps
t
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⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
=
=
=
=
0
                                
        
            4
        
            6
    0   1
 
The dummy measures the effect of an anticipated monetary policy shock on volatility. 
ix)  1 , 7 5 ; 9 7 _ _ − − − ⋅ = t t t LNRV mps d per d , where 
.
0
    7 6 , 5   &   0
    9 8 , 7   &   0
  1
_ , 5 7
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎩
⎨
⎧
= ≠
= ≠
= −
otherwise
day the of th window  or th th t mps
day the of th window  or th th t mps
if
mps d t
t
t  
This variable captures the volatility persistence over the three windows immediately 
after a monetary policy shock.  
We want estimate the effect of unobservable differences in private information 
or beliefs on volatility. In order to do this we evaluate the volatility effect of an un-
anticipated monetary policy shock in relation to the quality of public information 
available about the bank ex ante. Our measure of the quality of public information is the 
vintage of the last annual report released by the bank.
13 The vintage is given by the 
number of months since the bank published its last report.
14 We hypothesise that, as the 
report gets older, the information contained depreciates in value to traders. We argue 
that volatility is generated by a combination of the news effect of the monetary policy 
decision itself (public information) and by differences in the interpretation of the effect 
of this news on the banks (Harris and Raviv, 2003; Shalen, 2003). As the quality of the 
prior information about the bank increases (is more up to date and less stale), we would 
expect a smaller effect of the monetary policy shock on bank stock return volatility. 
This approach to testing for the presence of private information in the market has two 
important advantages. One, it does not suffer from reverse causality. Reverse causality 
could arise if banks react to high volatility of their own stock price by releasing more 
information to the market (see e.g. Baumann and Nier, 2004). Second, by focusing on 
differences in volatility response to shocks within the same bank, we would argue that 
                                                 
13 We examine the effect of interim reports published by the bank below. 
14 We obtained the annual report release dates (and the dates of the release of interim reports, see below) 
from Reuters News service.   13
our results do not suffer from omitted variable bias, i.e. that the differences in volatility 
are driven not by differences in information but by differences in some omitted variable 
that is correlated with information. This problem frequently arises when the 
identification of the model largely relies on cross-sectional differences among banks. In 
our approach, we test whether the response in volatility of, say, Deutsche Bank is higher 
if the last annual report of Deutsche Bank was released 10 months ago compared to the 
response in volatility of Deutsche bank if the last annual report was released just 2 
months ago. 
Table 2 illustrates this point. It shows the number of months before a given 
monetary policy surprise (of the ECB or the Bank of England, respectively) the annual 
report of the bank was released. It shows that the sample is essentially uniformly 
distributed across the different time leads between publication and the monetary policy 
surprises in the sample. This is true both for the sample as a whole, as well as for each 
individual bank. Overall, this re-enforces our point that this time difference is indeed 
uncorrelated with the identity of the bank. 
Therefore, we estimate a second specification which differs from the basic 
model in equation (2) by interacting monetary policy surprises with the number of 
months since the publication of the last annual report. The variables  t mps  and  per _ dt  
are replaced each by: 
∑
=
=
12
1 i
i , t t arep mps  and  ∑
=
=
12
1 i
i , t t dp per _ d . 
 
These variables are defined as follows:  t t , ai i , t mps d arep = , and  per _ d d dp t t , ai i , t = ,  
 
where 
⎩
⎨
⎧
=
otherwise
ago months i released is report annual the if
d t , ai 0
                1
 and i=1..12. 
 
 
5.  Empirical Results 
In the first set of columns of Table 3 we report the estimation results of the basic model 
described by equation (3). Parameters are estimated by a pooled-OLS regression with 
cluster robust standard errors.
15 As expected, volatility is highly persistent: about 54% 
of a given shock is transmitted to the next time window. The bank dummies indicate the 
difference in volatility averages vis-à-vis Deutsche Bank. Commerzbank, 
Hypovereinsbank, ING, Abbey National, RBS and Barclays show relatively higher 
                                                 
15 The cluster option allows relaxing the assumption of observation independence within banks.   14
volatility. The level of volatility of the other banks does not tend to be significantly 
different from that of Deutsche Bank. Time dummies indicate that volatility is more 
pronounced in the years before 2004, reaching higher levels in 2002 and 2003. This 
may be due to down market effects. The coefficients associated with the window 
dummies  i t w _ d  broadly confirm the daily U-shape of the realised volatility (see figures 
2a-2k) with the fourth window, commencing at 11:27 (11:16) and ending 46 minutes 
later for the euro area (UK), respectively. As regards to the day of the week dummies, 
we find no significant difference in volatility between Wednesdays (omitted category), 
Thursdays, Mondays and Tuesdays. However, volatility tends to be significantly higher 
on Fridays, which is consistent with the previous literature on intraday volatility in 
stock markets (see e.g. Andersen et al., 2000a). 
When the monetary policy decision comes as a surprise, volatility significantly 
jumps up. A surprise, say, of 50 basis points generates, on average, an increase in 
volatility approximately equal to one percent.
16 On the other hand, volatility does not 
significantly change when the decision is fully anticipated by market participants 
(“nomps”). As seen from figures 2a-2k, the effect on volatility of a monetary policy 
surprise tends to be persistent. After the shock, the volatility measured in the days of 
surprises is, by and large, higher than the volatility computed over the other days. The 
coefficient associated with the three following time windows after the surprise, d_per, is 
significant at the one percent level, although quite small. 
Next, let us consider the effect of the quality of public information on volatility, 
as proxied for by the vintage of the annual reports. Estimation results of the extended 
model are reported in the second set of columns of Table 3. In Figures 3 and 4 we plot, 
respectively, coefficient values corresponding to  1 , t arep  –  12 , t arep  and  1 dp  –  12 dp  
against the information lags. A simple regression line fitted to coefficient values is 
increasing, suggesting that, as information becomes outdated, the effect of surprises on 
volatility becomes higher and more persistent.
17 However, a number of the estimated 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we combine the 
monthly variables into quarterly variables.
18 The coefficients for the resulting 
“Restricted Model” are reported in the third set of columns in Table 3. They suggest 
                                                 
16 As the dependent variable is in logs, the reported coefficients are semi-elasticities. 
17 A second order polynomial fitted to the same data points is also monotonically increasing. 
18 We alternatively also used an F-test to aggregate variables. We first test the null hypothesis that the first 
two  i , t arep  coefficients are equal. If the null is not rejected, we test whether the third coefficient is equal 
to the first two. We continue until the null is rejected. When this occurs, we start again testing the null 
that the last coefficient is equal to the following one. The procedure ends when all coefficients are 
classified. The results are conditional on the choice of the starting null hypothesis. The choice is 
suggested by the shape of the second order polynomials. The results are consistent with the specification 
using quarterly variables.   15
that the effect of a monetary policy shock on volatility is about three times the size if the 
report is 10 to 12 months old compared to when the report is fresh, i.e. 1 to 3 months 
old. All coefficients are significant at least at the five percent level and the difference 
between annual reports being 1 to 3 months old to annual reports being 10 to 12 months 
is significant at the one percent level. Similarly, we find hardly any persistence in the 
shock when the annual report is fresh, whereas if the report is old, persistence increases 
by more than 1 percent. Again, the difference is significant at the one percent level. 
Economically, if the publicly available information about the banks is current, i.e. no 
more than 3 months old, a 50 basis point monetary policy surprise results in an increase 
in volatility of about 0.6 percent. If the information is stale (i.e. 10 to 12 months old), 
this increases to more than 2 percent.  
However, we also find that the increase in volatility is not monotonic. Both for 
the volatility spike itself and for its persistence we estimate a noticeable dip if the 
annual report is 7 to 9 months old. We hypothesised that this may have to do with the 
publication of interim and, in particular, semi-annual reports. These reports could also 
contribute to aligning trader’s information sets. Since banks typically publish a semi-
annual report about six months after publishing their annual report, the dip in the 
volatility effect may be due to the information contained in those reports. However, 
many of the banks in the sample also publish quarterly reports and they, even though 
they contain significantly less information compared to annual reports, may also be 
useful to traders.  
As a consequence we performed two additional estimations. One, we estimate 
whether the simple fact that the bank published an interim report (whether quarterly or 
semi-annual) had information value to traders. We do this by interacting the “arep” 
variables with a dummy equal to one, if an interim report was published during the 
period. If interim reports contain important information, we would expect to find that 
even if the annual report was published quite some time ago, the volatility effect of a 
monetary policy surprise remains small if an interim report was published recently. The 
results for this exercise are reported in Table 4 and suggest that in general this does not 
seem to be the case and interim reports provide no additional information to traders. 
Second, we started from which information traders would find useful in 
estimating the impact of an unanticipated interest rate shock on banks and what is 
contained in the “most extensive” reports in our sample. We identified eight items: 
1.  Information interest rate risk and how the bank deals with it 
2.  Breakdown of the loan portfolio into variable rate and fixed rate loans 
3.  Breakdown of loan commitments into variable rate and fixed rate   16
4.  Data on the use of interest rate derivatives 
5.  Detailed value-at-risk information for interest rate risk 
6.  Fair value reporting of the loan portfolio 
7.  Remaining term to maturity breakdown for loans and deposits 
8.  Detailed explanations of interest income and expenses 
We then checked to which extent this type of information is available in annual or 
interim reports and classified reports as informative if at least 6 of the eight items were 
available and uninformative otherwise. It turns out that this approach results in the 
classification of all annual reports as informative. In addition, all interim reports are 
classified as uninformative with the following exceptions:
19  
Deutsche Bank: Interim report Q2 1999 
Barclays: all semi-annual reports from 1998-2004 
HSBC: all semi-annual reports from 2001-2004 
Abbey National: Semi-annual report 2003 
BNP Paribas: Interim reports Q2 from 2002-2004
20 
Societe Generale: Interim report Q2 2003 
Based on this information we re-coded the “arep” variables to reflect the latest 
informative report, whether annual or interim and re-estimated the model. The results 
are reported in Table 4 (“Interim report model II”). It appears that traders value 
informative reports, as defined here. The dip in the effect on volatility for 7 to 9 months 
information is now much smaller than in previous specifications (a coefficient of 3.24 
relative to 1.86); however, overall the results suggest that information does not 
depreciate linearly in value to traders. There is a steep increase in volatility if 
informative reports are older than 3 months (the impact of a monetary policy surprise 
doubles) but little additional depreciation as an informative report becomes even older. 
Overall, we interpret these results as consistent with the presence of private 
information in markets. As investors have more accurate information about the bank 
(because the annual report is recent and informative), they disagree less about the effect 
of the shock on the earnings potential of the bank. Therefore, the impact volatility of the 
monetary policy surprise is lower and less persistent. This effect is economically quite 
significant. The results also suggest that the information given in annual reports (and 
some interim reports) by banks is valuable to market participants and conveys useful 
information about banks, at least in the context of aiding markets to interpret the impact 
                                                 
19 Appendix III gives more details on interim reports. 
20 BNP Paribas publishes an “extensive” interim report for the second quarter of each year and a short 
version for Q1 and Q3.   17
of unanticipated monetary policy on banks. Annual reports appear to reduce the opacity 
of banks. Finally, we show that the value of information contained in banks’ annual 
reports depreciates relatively quickly over time.  
 
6.  Robustness  
We conduct two exercises to check whether the above result is robust to changes in the 
definition of monetary policy shocks. First, instead of interacting the vintage of the 
annual report with the size of the monetary policy surprise, we interact the vintage of 
the annual report with a dummy variable indicating whether or not there was a surprise. 
Hence, we abstract from the size of the monetary policy shock (Table 5, robustness I). 
The results are economically and econometrically extremely similar to those reported in 
Table 3, although the depreciation over time seems to be smoother compared to the 
earlier specifications.  
Second, we examined the euro area and the UK separately, as there may 
important differences in the way monetary policy is conducted and the communication 
policy of the respective central banks. The results are reported in Table 5 and show that 
the impact of monetary policy shocks is larger if the annual report is older in both 
economic areas, even though there is a level effect (no matter the vintage of the annual 
report), since the overall magnitude of the coefficients is higher in the UK compared to 
the euro area.
21 The magnitude of the effect of the vintage of the annual report is 
significant in both cases: If the annual report is 10 to 12 months old, the effect of 
monetary policy surprises on stock price volatility is five times (two times) compared to 
the effect when the annual report was just published in the euro area (the UK).
22 
Finally, we also have some banks which are cross-listed in the US New York 
Stock exchange and some banks that are not. Listing at the NYSE implies that banks 
have to fulfil certain additional transparency requirements in line with US GAAP, 
including for example reporting fair values on its loan portfolio in the notes to the 
annual report.
23 If this additional information is valuable, banks that are cross-listed 
should exhibit a smaller increase in volatility (and less persistence). We find strong 
                                                 
21 This suggests that the impact of monetary policy shocks on bank stock volatility is overall higher in the 
UK. One interpretation of this finding would be that market participants find the effect of monetary policy 
surprises on bank profitability more difficult to estimate in case of UK banks. This may have a myriad of 
reasons, including a more complex balance sheet structure, greater exposure to more complex assets or 
other issues. 
22 The dip after six months is also present in both economic areas when estimating the model separately, 
as we did not use the information contained in “informative” interim reports in this section. 
23 For a summary of the debate surrounding the introduction of fair value accounting for banks in Europe 
in connection with IAS 39, see Enria et al. (2004) and Michael (2004).   18
evidence for this idea: A dummy indicating whether or not the bank was cross-listed in 
the US interacted with the monetary policy surprise was highly significant and negative, 
suggesting that impact of monetary policy surprises for those banks is smaller. While 
we think that these results overall provide further support to our ideas, they are a little 
difficult to interpret, as the dummy on cross-listing is endogenous and may reflect other 
differences in releasing information or business policy about the bank. A complete set 
of these results are available upon request. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of monetary policy surprises on the 
volatility of equity returns for the largest European banks, taking into account the 
quality of public information available at the time of the surprise. We use this as a new 
approach to testing for the importance of differences in opinions among traders in 
explaining volatility. We provide evidence that stale public information (older annual 
and interim reports) significantly increase volatility upon an un-anticipated monetary 
policy shock. We find a similar information effect on persistence of volatility. Finally, 
our results suggest that accounting information may depreciate quite quickly over time, 
i.e. within three months, suggesting a relatively high frequency of information releases 
by banks. 
The results in this paper are in our view strong evidence in support of Harris and 
Raviv (2003) and Shalen (2003), in the sense that they suggest that if investors 
information set is poorly aligned to due stale publicly available information, the impact 
on volatility of an unanticipated shock (in this case a monetary policy shock) is larger 
than if the publicly available information is fresh. Disagreements among traders based 
on differences in interpretation of the publicly available information become more 
important in case public information is stale. This adds to the body of literature showing 
that private information in markets matters for explaining volatility (e.g. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991), Ito and Lin (1992) and Ito et al. (1998) Hautsch and Hess, 2002 and 
Fleming and Remolona, 1999). The methodology used in the paper and most 
importantly the approach used to identify the effect of private information differs 
sharply, however, from the previous literature.  
The findings can also be interpreted as providing a new perspective on the 
question of bank opacity (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al, 2004). While we do not provide 
direct evidence on whether banks are more or less opaque than non-financial firms, we 
show that bank transparency, detail in annual reports and, especially, the issuance of   19
frequent reports, reduces opacity and is valuable to investors. This is also interesting in 
light of the recent debate surrounding the idea to increase transparency of banks, 
reflected in Pillar III of the New Basel Accord. The New Accord will ask banks to 
significantly increase the information that they should report to markets. The results 
presented in this paper suggest that the implementation of these transparency 
requirements is important. The results of the paper would call for a relatively high 
frequency of information releases of banks, as the information tends to depreciate 
quickly in value. In the context of indirect market discipline of banks, namely the idea 
that supervisors use market prices (especially stock prices) to identify weak banks, this 
may aide supervisors (and potentially also market participants) to better identify such 
signals (see e.g. Borio et al., 2004 for an overview). 
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 Table 1: Descriptive statistics of monetary policy decisions 
 
Total 101 Average rate increase 0.32 Days with surprises 56
without rate changes 86 Average rate decrease -0.44 Days with positive surprises 
* 35
with rate changes 15 Number of days with 0.25 increase 5 Days with negative surprises 
** 21
no. of rate increases 7 Number of days with 0.5 increase 2 Days without surprises 45
no. of rate decreases 8 Number of days with 0.25 decrease 2 Average positive surprise 
* 0.09
Number of days with 0.5 decrease 6 Average negative surprise 
** -0.22
* Tighter than expected monetary policy
** Looser than expected monetary policy
Total 66 Average rate increase 0.25 Days with surprises 51
without rate changes 50 Average rate decrease -0.25 Days with positive surprises 
* 29
with rate changes 16 Number of days with 0.25 increase 7 Days with negative surprises 
** 22
no. of rate increases 7 Number of days with 0.5 increase 0 Days without surprises 15
no. of rate decreases 9 Number of days with 0.25 decrease 9 Average positive surprise 
* 0.036
Number of days with 0.5 decrease 0 Average negative surprise 
** -0.054
* Tighter than expected monetary policy
** Looser than expected monetary policy
Panel B : BoE Monetary policy decisions (January 1999 - May 2004)
Monetary policy decision days Size of monetary policy decisions Unexpected monetary policy decisions
Panel A : ECB Monetary policy decisions (January 1999 - May 2004)
Monetary policy decision days Size of monetary policy decisions Unexpected monetary policy decisions
  
Table 2: Monetary policy surprises and annual reports: descriptive statistics 
 
Number of months before a monetary policy surprise that the annual report was released. Monetary policy 
surprises are defined as the difference in the Reuter’s poll and the change in the respective policy rate.  
 
           
               
               
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  ≥12  Total 
               
               
Euro area               
               
Deutsche  Bank 6 6 4 6 3 5 3 6 6 4 3 4 56 
Hypovereinsbank  5 6 4 5 5 7 2 3 8 4 2 5 56 
Commerzbank  5 6 5 6 5 3 5 4 7 3 2 5 56 
ABN  Amro  2 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 14 
ING  Bank  2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
BNP  Paribas  2 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Société  Générale  2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
               
UK               
               
HSBC  4 3 3 4 4 1 2 4 4 4 4 5 42 
Abbey  National  4 5 5 5 4 1 1 5 4 4 5 7 50 
Royal Bank of  
Scotland 
5 5 5 5 3 2 3 5 4 4 5 5 51 
Barclays  6 5 4 6 4 1 1 5 3 4 3 8 50 
               
Total  43 40 33 45 33 24 20 37 40 31 27 44 417 
               
 Table 3: Estimation results 
 
Estimated using equation (2) in the text using OLS with robust standard errors (clustering for banks). Omitted 
categories: Deutsche Bank, 2004, interval 4, Wednesdays. The unrestricted and the restricted model contain the 
same non-monetary policy control variables as the basic model. 
** and 
* suggest significance at 1%, and 5 % 
level, respectively. LNRV denotes the natural log of realised volatility, HSBC stands for HSBC, ABBN for 
Abbey National Bank, RBS for Royal Bank of Scotland, BAR for Barclays, ABN for ABN Amro, ING for ING 
Bank, BNP for BNP Paribas, SG for Société Générale, DB for Deutsche Bank, HB for Hypovereinsbank, and 
CB for Commerzbank. The dependent variable is the natural log of realised volatility (as described in the text) in 
window t for bank i. 
 
 
Basic Model Unrestricted  Model Restricted  Model   
               
Variable Coef.  t-stat. Variable  Coef.  t-stat.  Variable  Coef.  t-stat. 
              
LNRVt-1  0.54** 14.42  arep1    2.52*  2.67  arep1_3   1.21**  2.57 
d_cb  0.11** 11.94  arep2    0.97*  2.66  arep4_6  3.40*** 4.60 
d_hb  0.10** 12.30  arep3    0.97  1.45  arep7_9  1.86*** 3.17 
d_abn  -0.02 -1.13  arep4    3.61**  4.08  arep10-12  4.50*** 4.25 
d_ing  0.05* 2.33  arep5    3.88**  6.09  dp1_3   -0.00  -0.63 
d_bnp  -0.00 -0.02  arep6  0.83 0.47  dp4_6    0.017***  3.65 
d_sg  0.03 1.48  arep7    2.19  1.98  dp7_9   0.005  1.39 
d_hsbc  -0.01 -2.03  arep8    1.17  1.75  dp10_12  0.012*** 3.54 
d_abbn  0.16** 13.00  arep9   3.10*  2.84   
   
d_rbs  0.14** 16.35  arep10    6.10**  5.47   
   
d_bar  0.12** 15.04  arep11    4.64  1.62   
   
d_1999  0.16** 4.19  arep12    3.85*  2.21   
   
d_2000  0.19** 5.14  dp1    -0.00  -0.11   
   
d_2001  0.19** 6.16  dp2   -0.00  -0.69   
   
d_2002  0.26** 14.44  dp3    -0.01  -0.81      
d_2003  0.20** 21.06  dp4   0.02**  3.41   
   
d_int1  0.02 1.50  dp5   0.02**  4.11   
   
d_int2  0.04** 5.66  dp6   0.00  0.20   
   
d_int3  0.02* 3.00  dp7  0.02* 2.41   
d_int5  0.03** 3.19  dp8   -0.01  -1.31      
d_int6  0.09** 5.13  dp9   0.01  1.90      
d_int7  0.16** 17.53  dp10   0.01  0.89      
d_int8  0.20** 8.91  dp11   0.01  0.97   
d_int9  0.37** 4.38  dp12   0.02**  5.41      
d_montue  0.02 1.27          
d_thur  0.01 1.51          
d_fri  0.03** 5.25          
nomps  0.07 2.20          
mps  2.05** 4.23          
d_per  0.01** 3.51          
constant  -2.71** -12.01          
N 17820  17820 
R
2 0.41  0.43 
17820 
0.43 
 Table 4: Information content of interim reports 
 
Estimated with OLS using robust standard errors. In interim model I arep4_6int is equal to the size of the 
monetary policy surprise if the annual report was published 4 to 6 months ago and an interim report was 
published during the period. Equivalently arep4_6nint is equal to the size of the monetary policy shock if the 
annual report was published 4 to 6 months ago and no interim report was published during the period. In interim 
model II all “arep” variables were recoded measuring the number of months since an informative report (whether 
annual or interim) was published. “Informative” defined in the text. Both models include all variables of the 
previous specification. Only coefficients of interest reported for brevity. 
 
  Interim Report Model I    Interim Report model II 
Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable  Coeff.  t-stat 
        
arep1_3 1.19**  2.55  arep1_3  1.64  1.87 
arep4_6int 3.54***  15.94  arep4_6  4.51**  2.81 
arep4_6nint 3.07  1.47  arep7_9  3.24**  2.92 
arep7_9int  1.85* 2.12 arep10_12  4.96***  5.09 
arep7_9nint  1.40***  7.91     
arep10_12int  4.98***  5.22     
arep10_12nint  4.65***  2.76     
N 17820    17820 
R
2 0.43    0.44 
    
 
Table 5: Robustness checks 
 
Estimated using OLS using robust standard errors. Robustness I reflects a model in which the monetary policy 
surprises are measured with a dummy variable, i.e. the size of the surprise does not enter. All models include all 
variables of the previous specifications. Only coefficients of interest reported for brevity. 
 
  Robustness I    Euro area banks 
only 
UK banks only 
Variable  Coeff. t-stat.  Variable Coeff. t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
              
dumsup1_3 0.13***  3.19  arep1_3  0.51***  4.22 3.62*  2.86 
dumsup4_6 0.19***  4.41  arep4_6  2.68**  3.52 6.91**  4.53 
dumsup7_9 0.32***  5.25  arep7_9  1.32*  2.42 3.03  2.17 
dumsup10_12 0.47***  5.86  arep10_12  2.73**  3.33  7.63*  3.05 
N 17820    11142  6678 
R
2 0.43    0.53  0.52 Appendix I: Descriptive statistics of equity returns, standardised equity returns, 
realised volatilities and log of realised volatilities 
 
 RT_HSBC  STRT_HSBC  RV_HSBC  LNRV_HSBC 
Mean  0.00009 0.00408  0.00640  -5.27404 
Median  0.00000 0.00000  0.00478  -5.34376 
Maximum  0.02388 4.79583  0.12424  -2.08552 
Minimum  -0.02293 -2.67198 0.00030 -8.10619 
Std. Dev.  0.00417 0.69636  0.00663 0.60708 
Skewness  0.24660 0.19919  7.87243 0.72634 
Kurtosis  6.78 4.77  103.43  4.68 
Jarque-Bera  1024.6 231.9  727673.6  346.3 
Probability  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10)  10.17 8.36  181.04 1128.00 
Observations  1690 1690  1690 1690 
       
 RT_ABBN  STRT_ABBN  RV_ABBN  LNRV_ABBN 
Mean  0.00005 0.03038  0.00942  -4.87976 
Median  -0.00001 -0.00228 0.00736 -4.91173 
Maximum  0.08441 4.79583  0.09371  -2.36759 
Minimum  -0.05402 -3.19664 0.00121 -6.71609 
Std. Dev.  0.00762 0.80058  0.00768 0.63178 
Skewness  0.28898 0.67459  3.82857 0.27901 
Kurtosis  15.53549 6.64651  27.88452 3.45253 
Jarque-Bera  12401.0 1190.5  53382.3  40.6 
Probability  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10)  11.86  27.33 393.77  1127.90 
Observations  1890 1890  1890 1890 
       
 RT_RBS  STRT_RBS  RV_RBS  LNRV_RBS 
Mean  0.00002 0.00927  0.00859  -4.97074 
Median  0.00000 0.00000  0.00652  -5.03309 
Maximum  0.06851 4.14226  0.07386  -2.60559 
Minimum  -0.05431 -4.79583 0.00131 -6.63635 
Std. Dev.  0.00704 0.78757  0.00714 0.61412 
Skewness  0.40899 -0.27529  3.52423 0.59460 
Kurtosis  14.04592 6.15693  22.21690 3.42949 
Jarque-Bera  9661.2 808.7  32993.9  125.9 
Probability  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10)  25.70  14.36  617.33 1103.30 
Observations  1890 1890  1890 1890 
       
 RT_BAR  STRT_BAR  RV_BAR  LNRV_BAR 
Mean  -0.00018 -0.01719 0.00848 -4.99245 
Median  -0.00008 -0.01229 0.00655 -5.02860 
Maximum  0.03562 4.79583  0.07901  -2.53824 
Minimum  -0.03522 -4.79583 0.00128 -6.66281 
Std. Dev.  0.00653 0.79561  0.00726 0.63030 
Skewness  -0.01037 -0.24625 3.73863  0.50216 
Kurtosis  7.01948 6.52590  24.56051  3.47069 
Jarque-Bera  1252.1 982.3  40359.3 95.3 
Probability  0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10)  11.33 15.60  388.40 1184.70 
Observations  1860 1860  1860 1860 
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 RT_ABN  STRT_ABN  RV_ABN LNRV_ABN 
Mean  -0.00015 -0.02533 0.00662 -5.18191 
Median  0.00000 0.00000  0.00533  -5.23517 
Maximum  0.03942 2.36589  0.02872  -3.55013 
Minimum  -0.02908 -3.09757 0.00158 -6.45095 
Std. Dev.  0.00656 0.82940  0.00412 0.56227 
Skewness  0.01531 -0.13809  1.59031 0.28705 
Kurtosis  7.04426 3.08834  5.92887 2.51144 
Jarque-Bera  586.1 3.01267  669.9  20.36339 
Probability  0.00000 0.22172  0.00000 0.00004 
Q(10)  11.70 8.61  3220.60 3511.60 
Observations  860 860  860 860 
       
 RT_ING  STRT_ING  RV_ING  LNRV_ING 
Mean  -0.00034 -0.02326 0.00771 -5.02258 
Median  -0.00049 -0.07191 0.00623 -5.07770 
Maximum  0.04948 2.58890  0.03541  -3.34064 
Minimum  -0.04329 -2.53604 0.00174 -6.35512 
Std. Dev.  0.00823 0.89216  0.00474 0.54963 
Skewness  -0.05213 0.06679 1.75587 0.28097 
Kurtosis  7.62067 2.60450  7.19859 2.62759 
Jarque-Bera  765.5 6.24466  1073.6  16.28465 
Probability  0.00000 0.04405  0.00000 0.00029 
Q(10) 19.22  19.52  2828.70  3354.20 
Observations  860 860  860 860 
       
 RT_BNP  STRT_BNP  RV_BNP  LNRV_BNP 
Mean  -0.00004 -0.00242 0.00659 -5.13648 
Median  0.00000 0.00000  0.00579  -5.15100 
Maximum  0.03824 2.47729  0.03044  -3.49195 
Minimum  -0.03114 -2.64988 0.00179 -6.32304 
Std. Dev.  0.00647 0.85248  0.00347 0.46896 
Skewness  0.02326 0.00579  1.84142 0.31058 
Kurtosis  6.46575 2.74881  8.46773 2.80742 
Jarque-Bera  430.5 2.26574  1557.3  15.15468 
Probability  0.00000 0.32211  0.00000 0.00051 
Q(10)  11.72 6.82  1693.10 1774.00 
Observations  860 860  860 860 
       
 RT_SG  STRT_SG  RV_SG  LNRV_SG 
Mean  -0.00013 0.00721 0.00711 -5.07650 
Median  0.00003 0.00787  0.00618  -5.08696 
Maximum  0.04909 2.49453  0.02743  -3.59621 
Minimum  -0.03181 -2.10022 0.00124 -6.69607 
Std. Dev.  0.00713 0.81710  0.00390 0.50335 
Skewness  0.21757 0.05793  1.53935 0.21594 
Kurtosis  8.29535 2.54741  5.98942 2.65952 
Jarque-Bera  1011.6 7.82122 659.9 10.83757 
Probability  0.00000 0.02003  0.00000 0.00443 
Q(10)  14.26 5.84  2266.00 2361.20 
Observations  860 860  860 860 
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  RT_DB STRT_DB RV_DB LNRV_DB 
Mean  0.00020 0.03619 0.00654 -5.13929 
Median  0.00021 0.03937 0.00576 -5.15712 
Maximum  0.05052 2.63303 0.03673 -3.30418 
Minimum  -0.04452 -2.36576 0.00157 -6.45493 
Std. Dev.  0.00634 0.81330 0.00336 0.45982 
Skewness  0.20751 0.05163 1.94191 0.22775 
Kurtosis  8.31199 2.80247 9.51167 3.12052 
Jarque-Bera  3525.0 6.16832 7137.8  27.56603 
Probability  0.00000 0.04577 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10)  12.62 9.49  6323.30 6249.60 
Observations  2980 2980 2980 2980 
      
 RT_HB  STRT_HB  RV_HB  LNRV_HB 
Mean  0.00007 0.01273 0.00857 -4.88640 
Median  0.00017 0.02667 0.00745 -4.89958 
Maximum  0.08342 2.66851 0.05749 -2.85620 
Minimum  -0.07068 -2.65283 0.00091 -6.99887 
Std. Dev.  0.00827 0.78716 0.00479 0.49526 
Skewness  0.19120 -0.02375 2.38755 0.16990 
Kurtosis  13.29451 3.04163 14.98986 3.14043 
Jarque-Bera  13177.0 0.49537 20681.0  16.78465 
Probability  0.00000 0.78061 0.00000 0.00023 
Q(10)  13.22 13.65  5729.90 6012.20 
Observations  2980 2980 2980 2980 
      
  RT_CB STRT_CB RV_CB LNRV_CB 
Mean  0.00003 -0.00511 0.00816 -4.92025 
Median  -0.00008 -0.01368 0.00698 -4.96502 
Maximum  0.10784 2.79882 0.05705 -2.86389 
Minimum  -0.05053 -2.68253 0.00097 -6.93674 
Std. Dev.  0.00741 0.71869 0.00436 0.45992 
Skewness  1.60941 0.10068 2.27839 0.33847 
Kurtosis  27.15508 3.37760 12.94284 3.43269 
Jarque-Bera  73733.7 22.73835 14853.4 80.14704 
Probability  0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 
Q(10) 25.40  15.44  8317.10 7758.80 
Observations  2980 2980 2980 2980 
 
RT stands for realised returns, STRT for standardised realised returns, RV for realised volatility, and LNRV for 
log of realised volatility. 
HSBC stands for HSBC, ABBN for Abbey National Bank, RBS for Royal Bank of Scotland, BAR for Barclays, 
ABN for ABN Amro, ING for ING Bank, BNP for BNP Paribas, SG for Société Générale, DB for Deutsche 
Bank, HB for Hypovereinsbank, and CB for Commerzbank. 
The realised returns are the sum of the two minute returns within a 46 minute window. Values are reported in 
fractions. The realised volatility is the square root of the sum of squared two minute returns within a 46 minute 
window. Standardised returns are the ratio of realised returns and their corresponding realised volatilities.  
 
Appendix II: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions 
 
LNRV represents the log of realised volatility. HSBC stands for HSBC, ABBN for Abbey National Bank, RBS 
for Royal Bank of Scotland, BAR for Barclays, ABN for ABN Amro, ING for ING Bank, BNP for BNP Paribas, 
SG for Société Générale, DB for Deutsche Bank, HVB for Hypovereinsbank, and CB for Commerzbank. d99 to 
d04 represent year dummies. d_1 to d_9 represent the time windows during the day and d_montue, d_wed, 
d_thur and d_fri are dummies representing the days of the week, respectively. mps is the monetary policy 
surprise as defined by the absolute value of the difference between the mean of the Reuter’s poll and the change 
in the policy rate. nomps represent days on which there was a monetary policy decision but no surprise. 
        
       
Variable N  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
       
       
lnrv   17820  -5.04  0.55  -8.11  -1.90 
lnrv1 17820  -5.05  0.54  -8.11  -1.90 
d_cb 17820  0.15  0.36  0 1 
d_db 17820  0.15  0.36  0 1 
d_hvb 17820  0.15  0.36 0  1 
d_abn 17820  0.04  0.20 0  1 
d_ing 17820  0.04  0.20  0  1 
d_bnp 17820  0.04  0.20 0  1 
d_sg 17820  0.04  0.20  0 1 
d_hsbc 17820  0.09  0.28  0  1 
d_abbn 17820  0.10  0.29  0  1 
d_rbs 17820  0.10  0.30  0  1 
d_bar 17820  0.10  0.30  0  1 
d99 17820  0.17  0.37  0  1 
d00 17820  0.18  0.38  0  1 
d01 17820  0.18  0.38  0  1 
d02 17820  0.19  0.39  0  1 
d03 17820  0.20  0.40  0  1 
d04 17820  0.08  0.27  0  1 
d_int1 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int2 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int3 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int4 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int5 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int6 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int7 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int8 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_int9 17820  0.11  0.31 0  1 
d_montue 17820  0.03  0.17  0  1 
d_wed 17820  0.33  0.47 0  1 
d_thur 17820  0.33  0.47 0  1 
d_fri 17820  0.31  0.46  0 1 
mps 17820  0.00  0.01  0  0.5 
nomps 17820  0.01  0.12 0  1 
d_per 17820  -0.35  1.28  -6.61  0 
       
  Figure 1: theoretical quantile–quantile pictures 
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 Figure 1 - Continued 
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 Figures 2a-2k 
 
HSBC - Realized volatility averages (169 days)
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ABBN - Realized volatility averages (189 days) 
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 Figures 2 – Continued 
RBS - Realized volatility averages (189 days)
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BAR - Realized volatility averages (186 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
Deutsche Bank - Realized volatility averages (298 days)
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Hypovereinsbank - Realized volatility averages(298 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
Commerzbank - Realized volatility averages(298 days)
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ABN Amro - Realized volatility averages(86 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
ING Bank - Realized volatility averages (86 days)
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BNP Paribas - Realized volatility averages(86 days)
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Figures 2 – continued 
Societe Generale - Realized volatility averages (86 days)
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